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Abstract
Background: Physicians in Israel are required to do an internship in an accredited hospital upon completion of the
medical studies, and prior to receiving the medical license. For most students, the assignment is determined by a
lottery, which takes into consideration the preferences of these students.
Objectives: We propose a novel way to perform this lottery, in which (on average) a larger number of students gets
one of their top choices. We report about implementing this method in the 2014 Internship Lottery in Israel.
Methods: The new method is based on calculating a tentative lottery, in which each student has some probability of
getting to each hospital. Then a computer program “trades” between the students, where trade is performed only if it
is beneficial to both sides. This trade creates surplus, which translates tomore students getting one of their top choices.
Results: The average student improved his place by 0.91 seats.
Conclusions: The new method can improve the welfare of medical graduates, by giving themmore probability to
get to one of their top choices. It can be applied in internship markets in other countries as well.
Keywords: Internship, Lottery, Market design, Israel, Medical graduates
Background
Variances in teaching and professional guidance, the
prospect of performing the residency in the same hos-
pital, social interests and different work terms all con-
tribute to the importance of where a medical graduate
will perform his year of internship. In Israel, despite its
relatively small size, location also plays a major role in
students’ preferences, and their choice among the 23
geographically-scattered hospitals which receive interns is
often influenced by this criterion. The importance of this
decision led to the establishment of student-run intern-
ship committee to which representatives are elected annu-
ally. The committee is responsible for setting the rules of
the internship lottery and prioritizing certain populations
such as outstanding students, PhD students, couples and
parents.
In the past couple of decades, this committee con-
verged to a method known as Random Serial Dictatorship
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(henceforth RSD)a. This mechanism randomly chooses an
ordering over students, and then the students take turns
in picking the hospital they want most among those which
still have not met their capacity. In Israel, up until a few
years ago when the system was computerized, students
physically gathered in a large auditorium and ID numbers
were drawn out of a hat. This method gives each intern
some probability of being assigned to any of the hospitals,
depending on his place in the ordering, on the decision
of the interns who were drawn before him, and his own
preferences.
While any allocation selected by RSD is ex-post Pareto-
efficientb, there are trade opportunities prior to con-
ducting the lottery. This paper describes the trade
opportunities, and how to utilize them to everyone’s
benefit.
We have applied this mechanism to assign medical stu-
dents to internships in Israel of the class of 2014. This
required approval by the ministry of health, by the stu-
dents’ internship committee, and by a ballot cast by the
students, in which the mechanism described hereafter
would achieve an absolute majority of the votes (the
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mechanism ended gaining the support of 80% of the voters
and 55% of the students). This paper presents the results
of the implementation.
Methods
We know that after the assignment is done, there is no
room for trade. Still, we want to let the students trade to
achieve a better allocation. Therefore, instead of trading
seats in hospitals, we trade probability shares. Indeed, a
student i attending the lottery should not care too much
about the internal mechanics − all he should care about is
pi,1, . . . pi,23 where pi,k is the probability student i gets his
k’th choice.
Looking at the probability vector each student gets, RSD
turns out to be far from optimal. Consider for example the
following fictitious lottery, which involves four students
and four hospitals, each with capacity 1 [Table 1].
We analyze the probability that Alice gets each hospital
in this example:
• With probability 14 she is the first to choose. In this
case she chooses A, and therefore Pr(A) = 14 .• With probability 14 she is the second to choose. In
this case A is already taken, and therefore she
chooses B. Therefore Pr(B) = 14 .• With probability 14 she is the third. In this case, A
and B are already taken, and Alice chooses C. But this
is not the only way Alice can get C. If Alice is the last
to choose, then it is possible that C is still open, and
she can take it. Indeed, if Diane goes first and takes A,
Bob goes second and takes B, Charlie is third and
takes D, then Alice can get C although she is the last
to choose. Looking at this more closely, one can see
that if Alice is fourth and Diane is not the third, Alice
would also get C. This means that the total
probability that Alice gets C is Pr(C) = 512 .• With probability 112 , Alice is fourth, and Diane was
third. This is the only case in which Alice gets D, and
therefore Pr(D) = 112 .
One can verify that the sum of probabilities is 1, and
Alice is always assigned to a hospital.
Table 1 The four students’ prioritized preferences over
hospitals
Alice Diane Bob Charlie
A A A A
B B B B
C C D D
D D C C
All students ranked hospitals A and B as their first or their second choice
respectively. Alice and Diane each ranked hospital C as their third choice and
then hospital D, while Bob and Charlie each ranked hospital D as their third
choice and C as their fourth.
A similar argument shows that Bob has probability of 14
to get A, probability of 14 to get B, probability of
5
12 to get
D and probability of 112 to get C.
Note that in this simple example, Alice and Bob could
trade probabilities, and this would benefit both of them.
Imagine that Bob could somehow give Alice his probabil-
ity of being assigned to C, and in return she would give
him her probability of being assigned to D. This would
result in a state in which Alice has probability of 14 for A,
1
4 for B and
1
2 for C. Bob would have probability of
1
4 for
A, 14 for B and
1
2 for D, which is an improvement for both
of them, compared to the RSD probability shares. Charlie
and Diane could trade probabilities among themselves in
a similar manner.
While this already improves the current state of affairs,
we can do even better. Suppose that Alice and Bob agree
on their first and tenth choices, but Bob’s second choice is
some hospital H, which is also Alice’s ninth choice. Also,
suppose that Alice has some positive probability p of being
assigned toH. In this case both students would possibly be
happier if Alice “gives” Bob her probability p of getting to
H, and Bob would “give” her p2 probability of getting to his
first place, and p2 probability of getting to his tenth place
(see Figure 1). In this case:
1. Assuming there is no huge gap between the ninth
place and the tenth place, Alice should be happy. She
“lost” probability p of getting to her ninth place, and
received probability of p2 to get to her tenth place
(similar), and probability of p2 to get to her first place.
2. Assuming there is no huge gap between the first and
second place, Bob should be happy. He lost p2
probability from his first place and p2 probability
from his tenth place, to get p probability for his
second place.
While clearly this trade is beneficial, it raises a couple of
subtle points, which are related:
Alice
Bob
A B H Z
A H Y Z
A B H Z








Figure 1 Alice gives Bob her probability of being assigned to H,
and in return she gets half of this probability to her first choice
and half of it to her last choice from Bob.
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1. Why should Bob give p2 of his tenth place and
p
2 of his
first place? Why not 2p3 of his tenth place, and
p
3 of his
first place, or vice verse, or some different numbers?
2. The difference between first and second place is
usually larger than that between ninth and tenth
place.
As explained below, the students were asked to fill sur-
veys, to assert the difference between the first and the
second place, the second and the third place and so on.
Based on the surveys results’, more weight was given to
the difference between first and second place than to the
difference between the ninth and the tenth.
One question which was not addressed in these simple
examples is how to decide which students should trade
with whom, and what trades to perform. Of course, the
students do not actually trade with each other, but rather
a computer program “virtually” trades on their behalf. We
also use more complex trades, which may involve three or
more students at once, if they benefit all the participants.
Another question is how do we perform the lottery at
the end of the process?With RSD, we could just choose an
ordering over the students. But in the first example, what
lottery gives Alice probability of 12 to get to C and Bob
probability 14 to get to D? Note that if each student would
just select a random hospital according to the probabili-
ties, it is possible that two students would be assigned to
the same hospital, so this is not a valid solution.
In the rest of the section, we formally explain our
method, and solve the two questions presented above.
Description of the new lottery
Our method works as follows. First, approximate the
probability of each student to be assigned to each hospi-
tal using RSD. We do this by running a large number of
trials, N, and by the law of large numbers the average of
all those RSD lotteries will be sufficiently close to the true
value. The probability is calculated as
pi,k = ni,kN , (1)
where ni,k is the number of RSD lotteries in which Stu-
dent i was assigned to the hospital he ranked as his k-th
choice.
Once we have the approximated probabilities we con-
tinue with the second stage of the algorithm which is
trading the probabilities among the students. We do this
using Linear Programming, which is a mathematical opti-
mization method for maximizing a target function sub-
ject to several constraints [1]c. In our interns assignment
problem there are two constraints:
1. Each hospital has an upper limit for the number of
interns that can be assigned to it. This capacity
constraint is determined by the Ministry of Health.
2. No student is worse off compared to what he would
have got under RSD. This individual rationality
constraint is enforced by defining the happiness of
each student from his vector of probabilities, and
then requiring that for every student individually the
happiness can not decrease by the trading stage
(intuitively if this would decrease his happiness the
student would not trade).
As for the target function, we want tomaximize the total
satisfaction of the students after trading. The full descrip-
tion of the constraints and the target function appears in
Appendix.
After the optimal probabilities have been acquired, we
only need to randomize an allocation according to these
probabilities. This, however, is not an easy process, as
we want the lottery over valid allocations to respect all
the interns’ probability allocations simultaneously. For-
tunately, the Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem provides
a solution to this problem [2,3]. In order to apply the
theorem for the allocation problem, we represent the
probabilities data we have until this stage with a matrix of
size n × m, where the rows are the interns, the columns
are the hospitals, and cell (i, j) represents Student i’s prob-
ability to be assigned to Hospital j. The theorem ensures
that any random assignment of the objects in the rows of
the matrix to the objects in the columns can be imple-
mented. Furthermore, Birkhoff ’s proof provides a con-
structive algorithm for the implementation [4]. Using an
extension of this theorem we can create a lottery which
respects the improved probabilities gained by trading [5].
Results and discussion
Figure 2 depicts the number of students who were
assigned to one of their top k choices as a function of k.
The gap between the two curves shown in the figure (the
area under the dashed curve) represents the improvement
of the new method compared to RSD. While RSD would
assign 203 interns to their first choice hospital, 50 to the
second and 59 to the third, the new method assigns 216
interns to their first choice, 84 to their second choice and
70 to the third choice.
Furthermore, using our data we would like to rate hospi-
tals, according to how high the interns ranked them. Such
a rating can be useful, since it gives the hospitals a better
picture of their status, and raises a red flag if a specific hos-
pital should improve the way it treats its interns or signals
quality to the Ministry of Health. Before we aggregate the
data to create such a rating, it is useful to look at the rank-
ing distribution of a specific hospital, and see if it makes
sense.
For example, Hadassah Medical Center’s ranking distri-
bution is depicted in Figure 3. About 10% of the interns
ranked Hadassah as one of their top three choices, which
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Figure 2 The number of interns as a function of being assigned one of their top choices. The solid line shows the results of RSD, and the
dashed line shows the result of the new method.
possibly indicates that they are residents of Jerusalem and
that location is important to them. The rest of the stu-
dents ranked Hadassah around the middle of their rank
order list, suggesting that interns consider Hadassah to be
a good hospital, and that the demand for being an intern
there is quite high.
We now aggregate the rankings of all students, to cre-
ate a rating across hospitals. We compare two methods of
rating the hospitals. The first method is to use the same
weights that we used when defining students’ happiness,
as described in Eq. 2d. The second method is the tradi-
tional rating of hospitals in this lottery, which is based
on the number of interns who ranked a specific hospital
as their first choice. Figure 4 demonstrates that our new
rating approach provides very different results from the
traditional rating approach, and it is perhaps more advis-
able to use it as it takes into account the entire rank order
lists of all students.
Comparing the two ratings, one can see several
differences:
1. In the traditional approach, Rabin-Hasharon comes
out last, although Rabin-Beilinson came in second.
The reason that this happens, is that every student
rates Rabin-Belinson above Rabin-Hasharon, so
Rabin Hasharon is never first. However, the
difference is very small - they are both campuses of
the Rabin Hospital, and are 10 minutes aparte. In the
new rating, Belinson comes in first (but almost at a
tie with Ichilov), and Hasharon comes sixth.
























Figure 3 The number of interns who ranked Hadassah hospital in each place.
























































































































































































































































Figure 4 A comparison between two rating approaches. (A) The number of interns who ranked the given hospital as their first choice. (B) The
calculated value of the given hospital according to the survey-based weights.
2. The last hospitals in the traditional rating have very
low scores, and a single student who changes his vote
can change the rating. The new rating is much more
robust.
3. The decay in the score makes more sense in the
second rating. It is never too sharp, and there is no
huge difference between the first two places.
We take the new rating as further evidence that the
values at which the algorithm trades probabilities make
sense.
Conclusion
In this paper we presented a novel technique to per-
form assignments, and showed that it greatly improved
the assignment of Israeli medical graduates to internships,
increasing the number of students who received one of
their top choices. This method requires the medical stu-
dents to “trade” probabilities to get to different places,
and therefore creates a new comparison between dif-
ferent hospitals, based on how much they are desired
in the trade. We presented the results of this compari-
son, and showed that it makes much more sense than
the traditional one (namely order the hospitals accord-
ing to the number of students who ranked them first).
Seeing that the new rating makes sense is an evidence
that the probabilities in the new lottery are traded
correctly.
A similar lottery can be applied to other countries with
an internship matching process in which future interns
belonging to the same category or rank have identical
priority (e.g., Australia and Ireland). Other countries that
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strictly rank all the interns (such as France) cannot benefit
from the suggested algorithm. Similarly, in countries in
which hospitals also have preferences over doctors, a bet-
ter treatment will be using a suitable two-sided matching
algorithm (e.g., the residency matches in UK and USA).
Our approach may be extended to other realms, such as
allocating seats in university courses. However, each appli-
cation could require some modifications to the algorithm,
depending on the specifics of the domain.
Endnotes
aOften referred to also as “Random Priority”. See, for
example, [6].
bMeaning that no trade can happen right after the
allocation. Indeed if Alice and Bob would like to swap
places after RSD is performed, and Alice chose her
hospital before Bob, then why didn’t she choose Bob’s
hospital? A mathematically equivalent way of saying this
is that no student can get a better hospital without
harming a different student. Note that it is possible that
preferences change between the time of the lottery, and
the actual start of residency, and then trade may be
beneficial for both sides − however, right after the lottery
is over students should not want to trade.
cSimilar approaches to object assignment have been
already suggested. See, for example, [7] and [8].
dThe rating we get using this method is very similar to
the rating one gets using the more familiar Borda Count
method.
eIn previous years they appeared together in the
internship forms under “Rabin” and a second lottery was
performed between the students to see which student
goes to which campus.
Appendix
Linear programming technical explanation
To represent the individual rationality constraint, Let m
be the number of hospitals, we define Student i’s happi-
ness prior to the trading stage as
hi = pi,1m2+pi,2(m − 1)2+pi,3(m − 2)2+ . . .+pi,m12
(2)
i.e., a function that represents students’ strong preference
to get to their top ranked hospitals. If the probabilities we
get after the trading stage are pˆi,k (as defined in Eq. 1), then
we define the happiness following the optimization as
hathi = hatpi,1m2 + hatpi,2(m − 1)2
+ hatpi,3(m − 2)2 + . . . + hatpi,m12.
(3)
Now our constraints are hˆi ≥ hi for every student i.
Regarding the target function, as described in the
Methods section, we want to maximize the total satisfac-
tion of the students after trading. Letting n denote the
number of students (in 2014, n = 496), our optimization




hˆi = hˆ1 + hˆ2 + ... + hˆn, (4)
that is, maximizing the sum of happiness for all interns.
This target function, as well as the definition of happiness
in Eq. 2, was chosen following a survey filled by approx-
imately 70 interns and 6th year medical students. We
note that using similar target functions and making small
changes in the weights used to define happiness did not
have a profound effect on the statistics of the assignment.
Applying the algorithm in the Israeli internship
market
One of the challenges we faced was how to introduce the
algorithm to the Israeli market. While there is a stan-
dard procedure for medical clinical trials, here there are
no patients involved, so it is less clear what experiments
should be made. To use the new algorithm, we needed the
agreement of two entities: the Ministry of Health and the
student body.
Convincing the Ministry of Health to participate was
relatively easy, since the Ministry of Health is happy to
try out new things. If an idea is not working well, one
class would suffer, but if an idea improves the system the
gain can affect future classes of students as well. While
the Ministry of Health is formally assigning students to
internships, for over a decade it has delegated the decision
of which student goes where to the students themselves.
Convincing the medical graduates to use the newmech-
anism was more complicated. Each medical graduate has
a "single experiment" (his own outcome), and sees no per-
sonal gain in improving the system for future generations.
Moreover, the happiness function assumes a certain dis-
tance between the first place to the second, the second to
the third and so on. If a student strongly disagrees with the
happiness function (e.g., the student is absolutely indif-
ferent between his top eight places but hates all the rest)
the new mechanism may not serve him well. The student
internship committee decided that there will be a poll on
whether the mechanism should be changed, and the new
mechanism needs to get an absolute majority (a major-
ity of the students should vote for the change and not
just a majority of the voters). The poll was conducted,
and 80% of the voters (55% of the students) preferred the
LP based mechanism. Talking to students and explaining
them the mechanism, we were impressed to see how well
they understood the mathematical notions behind it, and
their openness to new ideas.
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